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Thirteen years ago, South Africa underwent a peacefultransition from white minority rule to majority rule.Today, the country is a stable multiparty democracy.
It has the largest and the most sophisticated economy in
Africa, which generates almost 40 percent of all the wealth
produced on the African continent south of the Sahara.
The African National Congress government, which came to
power in 1994, deserves credit for stabilizing the economy
and returning it to a steady, albeit slow, growth path. 
The ANC’s democratic record is less impressive. The
government has transformed the state-owned South
African Broadcasting Corporation into an ANC propagan-
da machine that has banned some of the government’s
most prominent critics from appearing on it. The culture of
political correctness stifles public debate over the direction
of South Africa’s economic and social policies. Those who
dare to criticize the government are often labeled as racist.
Moreover, the ANC is considering new laws that would
undermine judicial independence.
It is increasingly apparent that the ANC wishes to domi-
nate the social and institutional life of South Africa in the
same way that it dominates the country’s political life.
Fortunately, the ANC continues to put great value on its
international reputation and tends to be hypersensitive to
international criticism. When the government does not act in
accordance with the spirit of liberal democracy, members of
international civil society groups, the diplomatic corps, and
the business community should voice their concern.
Constructive criticism could change the ANC’s behavior and
positively influence political developments in South Africa.
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Introduction
When he lifted the ban on the African
National Congress on February 2, 1990, South
African president F. W. de Klerk declared that
1989 would “go down in history as the year in
which Stalinist communism expired.” He later
added: “It was as if God had commanded a
turnabout in world history. We had to seize
the opportunity.”1
Indeed, South Africans have seized that his-
toric opportunity, and, some 17 years later, the
country that once stood on the brink of a civil
war is a stable multiparty democracy and an
influential member of a number of interna-
tional organizations.
Many of South Africa’s macroeconomic
indicators have improved. Between 1984 and
1993, the last 10 years of white rule, the com-
pounded average annual GDP growth rate per
capita was a negative 1.3 percent. In contrast,
between 1994 and 2003, the first 10 years of
ANC rule, the compounded average annual
GDP growth rate per capita was 0.9 percent.2
The GDP growth rate has accelerated in recent
years, reaching 5 percent in 2006.3
The budget deficit declined from 9.5 per-
cent of the GDP in 1993 to a projected budget
surplus in 2007.4 Consumer price inflation
has declined from a high of 18.7 percent in
1986 to a low of 1.4 percent in 2004. Inflation
has hovered around 5 percent since then.5
Unfortunately, some problems have gotten
worse. For example, the unemployment rate
increased from 20 percent in October 1994 to
26.7 percent in September 2005.6 Moreover,
violent crime and high rates of infectious dis-
eases continue to be a major problem.
Overall economic freedom in South Africa
increased from 5.3 in 1990 to 6.7 in 2004 on a
10-point scale. Out of the 130 countries sur-
veyed by the Fraser Institute in its 2006
Economic Freedom of the World report, South
Africa came in at 53rd place in 2004. After
Botswana and Mauritius, South Africa had
Africa’s third freest economy. The increase in
South Africa’s economic freedom is good
news, because countries with higher degrees of
economic freedom tend to have higher rates of
growth and higher per capita incomes than
countries with more restricted economies.7
But all is not well with South African
democracy. The ANC may have jettisoned
Marxist economics, but it has not abandoned
its Marxist party structure and its intolerance
for political opposition. The party is dominat-
ed by President Thabo Mbeki and his circle of
advisers, who discourage internal dissent with-
in the party. On the national level, the ANC
continues to extend its influence into virtually
every sphere of political and economic life.
The opposition parties are being undermined
through government propaganda and out-
right bullying.
Though the ANC continues to enjoy
much of the international support it received
in the days when it fought apartheid, a realis-
tic reassessment of the ANC’s attitude
toward multiparty democracy is long over-
due. The ANC seems determined to build
and maintain a permanent hold on power,
while using questionable tactics to achieve
those aims. Notwithstanding its contribu-
tion to the end of apartheid, the time has
come for the ANC to be treated like any other
political party—with a critical eye.
SABC:
The Government
Propaganda Machine
The South African Broadcasting Corpor-
ation is a state-owned and publicly funded
media group that includes 18 radio stations
and 4 television stations, with the unmatched
ability to reach viewers and listeners through-
out that vast country. South Africa also has a
privately owned and free-to-air broadcaster
called ETV and a privately owned and sub-
scription-funded (i.e., cable) network called
DSTV.
In addition to the SABC’s news coverage,
ETV is the only subscription-free source of
television news in South Africa. The SABC
used to broadcast CNN and BBC news, but
no longer does so. South Africans who wish
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to watch foreign news programs can do so
only by subscribing to DSTV. Unlike the
SABC, ETV does not receive public funds and
is, therefore, at a considerable disadvantage.8
ETV’s reporting in African languages, for
example, is dwarfed by that of the SABC. At
the end of 2006, consequently, the SABC’s
news programs averaged 9.3 million viewers
per week compared to ETV’s 1.3 million.9
In the days of apartheid, the SABC was seen
as a propaganda tool of the National Party
government. South Africans used to joke
about the SABC’s extensive coverage of inter-
national events and its lack of coverage of
domestic news, which, due to political turmoil
in the country, was mostly bad. The end of
apartheid was supposed to have made the
SABC independent, but the broadcaster soon
became accused of being a mouthpiece for the
ANC. Its reporting has been criticized for
ignoring the opposition parties, while lioniz-
ing the ANC, government ministers, and
President Thabo Mbeki.
For example, the International Federation
of Journalists, which is the largest global fed-
eration of journalists’ trade unions, has de-
nounced the SABC for cancelling the airing of
a documentary that the broadcaster deemed
critical of President Mbeki. According to
Aidan White, the general secretary of the IFJ,
the “SABC management had an informal
meeting with the presidency’s communica-
tions department . . . [and that] suggests there
was a degree of outside interference . . . There
are real concerns the station’s editorial inde-
pendence is under serious threat.”10 To make
things worse, it later emerged that the man-
agement of the SABC asked the producers of
the Mbeki documentary not to speak to the
journalists about the cancellation.
The SABC’s love-fest with the ANC often
leads to embarrassment. Soon after she was
appointed as South Africa’s deputy president,
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was booed by the
supporters of her predecessor, Jacob Zuma.
The SABC covered the rally, but did not broad-
cast the footage pertaining to the incident. In
the politically charged atmosphere that fol-
lowed Zuma’s dismissal from the number two
spot in the government, heckling of the new
deputy president was certainly newsworthy—a
fact pointed out by the South African print
media, much of which remains independent
of the government. Snuki Zikalala, the SABC’s
head of news and former spokesman for the
ANC, argued that the SABC cameraman was
not present when the vice-president was
booed. When ETV aired footage showing the
SABC filming the incident, the SABC was
forced to issue a humiliating apology.11
Moreover, a recent report coauthored by
the former head of the SABC, Zwelakhe
Sisulu, found that the SABC has banned a
number of outspoken critics of the ANC gov-
ernment from appearing on the SABC.12
Among them was President Mbeki’s brother,
Moeletsi, who criticized some of the govern-
ment’s race-based redistributionist economic
policies, such as the Black Economic Empow-
erment legislation, as well as his brother’s
accommodating attitude toward the Zimbab-
wean dictator Robert Mugabe.13
During the 2005 parliamentary elections in
Zimbabwe, which most international observers,
though not South Africa, rejected as fraudu-
lent, Zikalala banned Mbeki from appearing on
the SABC. He alleged that Mbeki “was not on
the ground in Zimbabwe” and “did not know
what was happening.” In fact, Mbeki knew
Zimbabwe very well. He used to live there when
the apartheid government banned him from
South Africa. His real transgression, it seems,
was to talk about the economic meltdown and
human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.14
South Africa’s state-owned and publicly
funded broadcaster is an important source of
information among the poor. Its pro-govern-
ment bias may have contributed to the
ANC’s increasing share of the vote, which has
risen from 62.6 percent in 1994 to 69.7 per-
cent in 2004.
Centralization of Power
The ANC’s goal, to quote former deputy
president Jacob Zuma, is to stay in power
“until Jesus comes back.”15 Indeed, the ANC
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seems set on extending its influence as wide-
ly as possible. As an internal discussion paper
drafted by Joel Netzhitenzhe, a member of
the ANC’s National Executive Committee
and one of President Mbeki’s closest confi-
dants, put it in 1998, “Transformation of the
state entails, first and foremost, extending
control over all levers of power: the army, the
police, the bureaucracy, intelligence struc-
tures, the judiciary, parastatals [i.e., state-
owned companies], and agencies such as reg-
ulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the
central bank and so on.”16
But, Netzhitenzhe remonstrated, progress
has been too slow. “Have we often not
allowed ourselves to be distracted by the shal-
low protestations of the Opposition backed
up by the media? Have we been sufficiently
open with the people about the problems we
face and the challenges that lie ahead or have
we reinforced the false impression that ‘we are
fully in charge,’” he asked.17
Much has changed since Netzhitenzhe
wrote those words. For example, the ANC has
come to dominate all nine provincial legisla-
tures. In the KwaZulu-Natal, which used to be
the power base of the Zulu chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party, the
ANC formed a majority government follow-
ing the 2004 general elections. The same hap-
pened in the Western Cape, which used to be
governed by the NP. Not content with those
electoral gains, the ANC has employed ques-
tionable tactics to try to gain control of the
only major city that remains outside of its con-
trol—Cape Town.
For much of the post-apartheid era, Cape
Town has been run by the opposition, first by
the NP and then by the Democratic Alliance.
Today, the city government consists of a coali-
tion of eight parties led by Mayor Helen Zille. A
former member of the Black Sash movement, a
South African human rights organization, and
a recipient of the United Nations’ Human
Rights Award, Zille is a woman of unimpeach-
able anti-apartheid credentials. But her mem-
bership in the DA, which is South Africa’s
main opposition party, makes her unpalatable
to the ANC. The ANC has recently tried to
replace Cape Town’s executive mayor system
with an executive committee, on which the
ANC, currently excluded from the city govern-
ment, would have a decisive say. The ANC was
forced to abandon its plans, but many com-
mentators saw the ANC’s proposals as a bla-
tant attempt to gain control over the city.18
As the anti-apartheid activist and the head
of the South African Institute of Race
Relations, John Kane-Berman, wrote at the
time:
It is . . . beyond doubt that an abuse of
power is being planned in the Western
Cape, where Richard Dyantyi, member
of the executive council (MEC) for
local government, has given notice of
his intention to use the Municipal
Structures Act to change the system of
municipal government in Cape Town.
The key import of the change will be to
strip the city’s mayor, Helen Zille of the
Democratic Alliance, of her executive
powers at the head of a coalition and
reduce her to a figurehead. . . . If the
ANC finds it so difficult to accept the
outcome of a municipal election it
loses, will it be able to accept the out-
come of a general election it might one
day lose?19
The ANC has also contemplated an even
more controversial initiative—amending the
Constitution to deprive the judiciary of some
of its independence. Judicial independence is
a necessary, though not sufficient, condition
for equal treatment of individuals before the
law—which is a fundamental characteristic of
a free and democratic society. Under the lead-
ership of Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, for
example, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court
routinely struck down Robert Mugabe’s
unconstitutional legislation as late as 2000—
some 20 years after Mugabe came to power.
Threatened with violence, Gubbay quit the
court in 2001. With his departure and
Mugabe’s appointment of a loyalist to head
the top court, the era of judicial indepen-
dence in Zimbabwe came to an end.20
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An independent judiciary free of arbitrary
government interference is also vital to the
protection of private property and inviolabil-
ity of contracts, which are necessary for eco-
nomic development. Again, the Zimbabwean
economic meltdown in recent years provides
a good example of what happens when a gov-
ernment undermines the rule of law and
expropriates private property.21
Unfortunately, some of the ANC’s propos-
als would take the “administrative power” over
the courts from the chief justice and give it to
the justice minister. That would put the jus-
tice minister in charge of court budgets—
something that the judiciary perceives as an
attack on its independence. Significantly, the
ANC’s proposals included a law that would
remove the power of the Constitutional Court
to suspend an act of Parliament that it
deemed unconstitutional. 
George Bizos, a prominent lawyer who
defended Nelson Mandela during the latter’s
treason trial in 1963, commented: “Any
attempt to limit the functions and jurisdiction
of the judiciary is an interference with its inde-
pendence and therefore a danger to be avoid-
ed. . . . I think there may be persons within the
Department of Justice who are anxious to con-
trol aspects of judicial administration.”22
He also likened the ANC’s proposals to the
events in the 1950s, when the all-white
Parliament passed a law that allowed it to over-
ride unfavorable court rulings. “I am not sug-
gesting that we are witnessing a similar level of
animosity today, but it may well be that some
recently proposed constitutional amendments
are the first step down that path,” Bizos con-
tinued.23 Though it seemed that the ANC’s
appetite for a battle over the judicial indepen-
dence waned last year, the National Executive
Council of the ANC revisited the courts agen-
da in March 2007, suggesting that the propos-
als are still very much alive.24
Liberation Mythology
In its drive to consolidate power, the ANC
mimics other liberation movements that
have created elaborate liberation myths that
overemphasize their own role in bringing
about majority rule while ignoring or deny-
ing the contributions of others. Such myths
are useful, for they enable liberation move-
ments to monopolize the appearance of
virtue and, with it, power.
Robert Mugabe, for example, has managed
to create a powerful narrative that denies any-
one but his own party, the ZANU-PF, any his-
toric role in bringing about the end of Ian
Smith’s government in Rhodesia. A perma-
nent possession of the moral high ground by
the ZANU-PF made it immensely difficult for
competing political forces to make a meaning-
ful contribution to the policy debate. Prevent-
ed from scoring policy successes, opposition
parties in Zimbabwe found it difficult to make
headway with the electorate.
Worse still, the liberation narrative propa-
gated by the Zimbabwe African National
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) allowed it
to undermine important contributions that
others, like Abel Muzorewa25 and Ndabaningi
Sithole,26 played in the fight against the
Rhodesian government. Unfortunately, by the
time that the majority of the Zimbabwean elec-
torate saw through the fog of Mugabe’s propa-
ganda and saw him for the tyrant that he was,
the opposition parties were emaciated and the
rule of law fatally undermined. Zimbabwe had
become a one-party dictatorship.
South Africa could face similar dangers in
the future. Young people today are increasing-
ly exposed to a doctored history of anti-
apartheid struggle that largely ignores the role
that Western powers, which imposed econom-
ic sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s,
played in ending white rule.27 The role of the
so-called white liberals, including iconic fig-
ures like Helen Suzman, Frederik van Zyl
Slabbert, and Colin Eglin, is also being mini-
mized.
The emerging liberation myth in South
Africa is deceptively simple. The blacks, rep-
resented by the ANC, fought the whites, rep-
resented by the NP, and the former won. In
fact, the ANC was far from alone in opposing
apartheid. As Tony Leon, the current leader
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of the DA, wrote:
One wonders how many school chil-
dren today know that Steve Biko28 was
not an ANC member, that the protest
in which Hector Peterson29 was killed
was organized by the AZAPO,30 or that
hundreds of anti-apartheid activists
were neither black nor ANC support-
ers.31
As Leon pointed out, dissent against apart-
heid spanned the entire racial spectrum. Prom-
inent members of the ANC included Indians
like Ahmed Kathrada and people of mixed black
and white origin like Trevor Manuel. The South
African Communist Party was for a long time
run by Joe Slovo, who was Jewish. 
Helen Suzman, also Jewish, was for a long
time the only opponent of apartheid in South
Africa’s all-white Parliament. First elected in
1953 on the United Party ticket, she switched
to the liberal Progressive Party, which she rep-
resented between 1959 and 1989. When the
government accused her of deliberately asking
embarrassing questions about imprisonment
without trial and mysterious deaths in deten-
tion, Suzman retorted, “It is the answers, not
the questions that are embarrassing.”32
Political Correctness and
the Silencing of Dissent
The ANC’s greatest ally in silencing dis-
sent is a monumentally oppressive culture of
political correctness in South Africa. Political
correctness originated in Great Britain and in
the United States in the 1980s.33 It came to be
characterized by elaborate speech codes and
behavioral patterns intended not to cause
offense to others, but in South Africa it
means something quite different. 
As R. W. Johnson, South African writer
and former director of the Helen Suzman
Foundation, has written: 
The consciousness that large groups of
people have been badly treated in the
past leads, on the one hand, to a strong
sense of assertiveness among such
groups . . . and on the other, to a pow-
erful sense of guilt among the former
oppressors. These two emotions inter-
act to produce a sort of moral auction,
which has evolved into a permanent
bargaining process . . . [the result of
which] is a culture of “entitlement.”34
One of the most consequential political
developments in post-apartheid South Africa
was the ANC’s success in projecting itself as
the central vehicle for correcting past wrongs.
The ANC, Johnson continued:
has been able to tack large parts of its
own agenda . . . onto the desiderata for
political correctness. This is why the
term [political correctness] is so differ-
ently understood in South Africa than
it is elsewhere. In practice, a great deal
of what is taken for political correct-
ness in South Africa is actually better
understood as part of the ANC’s hege-
monic project: that is to say, its
attempt to dominate the social, cultur-
al and institutional life of the country
as well as its political life.35
The ANC has been successful in creating a
political atmosphere in which views critical of
the ANC have become synonymous with oppo-
sition to transformation of the society from
racial exclusion to racial inclusion. In some
cases, the critics of the ANC, including those
with impeccable anti-apartheid credentials,
have been labeled racists.36 The effect of such
slurs, which are in the vast majority of cases
utterly unwarranted, on the political discourse
in South Africa can be readily imagined. For
example, liberal politicians, who are often on
the receiving end of the ANC’s invectives, advo-
cate a distinctive and potentially beneficial set
of economic and social policies. Those policies
are effectively disqualified from consideration
in the public forum, not because of their lack of
merit, but because of the racial profile and the
political affiliation of their advocates. 
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Today’s main opposition party in South
Africa is the Democratic Alliance. The DA is a
successor to the Progressive Party, which
opposed the apartheid policies of the domi-
nant NP in the all-white Parliament between
the 1960s and the 1980s. With its historical
commitment to equality before the law and
limited government, the DA has been critical
of the government’s affirmative action poli-
cies as well as of the centralization of power
in the hands of the ANC. 
In return, the ANC has demonized the DA
as un-African and, to use a contemporary
South African euphemism, “anti-transforma-
tionist.” Referring to the DA, Kader Asmal, the
erstwhile member of the ANC’s National
Executive Committee and government minis-
ter, wrote that South Africa was fed up with
the “liberals.” “A genuine liberalism,” he wrote,
“would not entertain untrammelled enthusi-
asm for the free markets. . . . A truer liberalism
would embrace and promote real equality and
equity, guided by liberal theorists such as
Oxford’s Joseph Raz or, before him, even John
Rawls, rather than by the libertarian excesses
and self-servingness of Thatcherism and
Robert Nozick.”37
The liberal critique of the ANC is varied. In
2004, for example, Suzman gave an interview
in which she was highly critical: “I had hoped
for something much better,” she said. “The
poor in this country have not benefited at all
from the ANC. This government spends like a
drunken sailor. . . . Instead of investing in pro-
jects to give people jobs, they spend millions
buying weapons and private jets, and sending
gifts [of weapons] to [Jean-Bertrand Aristide
of] Haiti.”38
Suzman’s criticism of the government
went beyond its failures to deliver on the
promises it has made to the electorate:
“Debate is almost non-existent and no one is
apparently accountable to anybody apart
from their political party bosses. It is bad
news for democracy in this country.”39
Tony Leon, who succeeded Suzman in
Parliament, has criticized the ANC for under-
mining debate and opposition. In turn,
Marthinus van Schalkwyk, a onetime leader of
the New National Party who switched to the
ANC and became South Africa’s Minister for
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, accused
Leon of becoming the Ian Smith of South
Africa, which is to say, a leader of a white com-
munity that is “isolated, angry, frustrated,
with no say [in politics] whatsoever.”40
Comparing opposition figures to former
white rulers alludes to racism or, at least, racial
insensitivity. Considering the history of South
Africa’s race relations, accusations of racism
are particularly painful for those whites, like
Leon, who were genuinely committed to fight-
ing for racial equality during the time of
apartheid. Persistent allusions to apartheid
and racism in everyday political discourse dis-
courage most nonblacks from expressing their
dissatisfaction with the ANC’s rule. Deprived
of an effective political voice and punished for
the crimes of their fathers through vigorous
application of affirmative action, many young
whites choose to leave. Between 1995 and
2005, for example, the white population of
South Africa declined by 16 percent.41
Of course, the poisonous political atmos-
phere in the country does not affect whites
alone. Black South Africans, like Moeletsi
Mbeki, who speak out against government
policies, have often been silenced by the state-
run broadcast media.
Still a Marxist Party
The ANC’s distaste for the opposing point
of view is rooted in the Cold War. When the
NP government started cracking down on the
party in the late 1960s, many of its top mem-
bers went into exile. Some, including Mbeki,
undertook military training in the Soviet
Union and became members of the ANC’s sis-
ter organization, the SACP. (Curiously, most
of Mbeki’s biographies omit his stint in the
USSR.) Many who remained in South Africa
were murdered or, like Nelson Mandela, spent
decades in prison. While in exile, the ANC
cadres were exposed to the rigid structure and
anti-democratic nature of the global commu-
nist movement.
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The end of the Cold War proved crucial to
South Africa’s transformation to a multiracial
democracy. It pulled the rug from under those
in the NP who feared that majority rule in
South Africa would bring about nationaliza-
tion of private property and the large-scale
pogroms that marked communist rule
throughout the world. But, the fall of the
Berlin Wall also exposed the ANC and the
SACP as ideological dinosaurs. Both parties
were still wedded to communism. In fact, the
SACP re-committed itself to building “East
Germany in Africa” just a few months before
the Berlin Wall fell.42
Nelson Mandela, who was released from
jail in February 1990, undertook the difficult
task of modernizing his party’s political agen-
da. Helped by the ANC’s iron discipline and
his unchallengeable stature as its leader,
Mandela severed the close link between the
SACP and the ANC, and forced the ANC to
abandon much of its Marxist ideological bag-
gage. The “exiles” were strong enough to push
through Mbeki’s appointment as South
Africa’s Deputy President despite Mandela’s
opposition, however. That appointment,
together with the aging Mandela’s increasing
detachment from day-to-day politics, ensured
that the ANC retained its Marxist party struc-
ture and its intolerance for political opposi-
tion.
When Mandela retired from the political
scene in 1999, Mbeki became president. Soon,
he made it clear that he would not tolerate
opposition within his own party. Thus, when
potential rivals began to emerge from within the
ANC, the president’s circle fabricated a ridicu-
lous “presidential plot” that accused high-rank-
ing ANC officials, including Mathews Phosa,
Cyril Ramaphosa, and Tokyo Sexwale, of con-
spiring against the president.43
Having silenced his opponents, Mbeki
was reelected in 2004. As R.W. Johnson
observed, “Mbeki’s second inauguration was
a virtual coronation, for he was now an
undisguisably imperial figure. More power
was now centralized under one man than
ever before in South African history—no less
than 400 people now worked in the presiden-
tial office and both the new cabinet positions
and the new premierships of the provinces
were awarded in very much the way an
absolute monarch of old distributed offices
to clients, mistresses and favorites.”44
Mbeki’s paranoid style of party leadership,
as demonstrated by the fabrication of the
“presidential plot,” is mirrored by the ANC’s
attitude to political opposition in the country.
Its treatment of the Democratic Alliance and
other opposition groups suggests that the
ANC perceives opposition parties, no matter
how loyal and well-intentioned, as enemies.
Conclusion
South Africa has the largest and the most
sophisticated economy in Africa. With a GDP
of $240 billion, South Africa accounted for 39
percent of all the wealth produced in Africa
south of the Sahara in 2005.45 A prosperous
and free South Africa is vital to stability and
economic development in Southern Africa.
For all those reasons, the Western diplo-
matic corps, members of international civil
society groups, and the business community
should keep a closer eye on political develop-
ments in South Africa. While recognizing the
improvements that have taken place under
ANC rule, they should speak out against
those policies and political behavior that
would undermine the rule of law, indepen-
dence of the judiciary, freedom of the media
and the functioning of opposition parties. 
Clearly, the interests of the ANC and
those of South Africa are not identical. The
ANC appears interested in concentrating and
maintaining power, while South Africa needs
a vibrant opposition movement. Only in an
atmosphere of openness, where different
views and policy recommendations can be
thrashed out without intimidation, can
South African society hope to find the
answers to its pressing social problems such
as crime, poverty, unemployment and the
spread of infectious diseases. After all, it is
precisely the ANC’s failure to deliver a higher
standard of living and ensure public safety
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that makes social unrest in South Africa a
real possibility.
Fortunately, the ANC continues to derive
much of its international standing and confi-
dence from the accolades it has received from
all corners of the world since the end of
apartheid. The party is hypersensitive to criti-
cism and, as President Mbeki’s reversal of his
denialist position on the causal link between
HIV and AIDS suggests, able to change course.
Constructive criticism of the ANC’s more out-
rageous policies could change its behavior and
positively influence political developments in
South Africa. In order to do so, however, such
criticism must be loud and unambiguous.
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